The Bill of Rights is an ordinary statute and not entrenched. It confers no power on the courts to strike down inconsistent legislation. Nevertheless, some would argue that
Bill of Rights would lead to the development of the law. 13 Debate therefore has focused on the extent to which this development can occur.
[6] Sections 3-7 are the operative sections of the Bill of Rights. These are discussed in more detail below. Basically, s3 is a key gateway to the application of the Bill of
Rights. This provides that the Bill of Rights applies to acts by all three branches of Government and also to acts which can be characterised as "public". Section 4 precludes the courts from invalidating any Act, including Acts passed prior to the Bill of Rights. The effect of this is that, on one view, the Bill of Rights is inferior to other Acts as the normal position is that, in the event of a conflict between two Acts, the later in time prevails. 14 The over-simplicity of the view that s4 of the Bill of Rights makes it inferior is apparent when we examine s6, which requires all enactments to be read consistently with the Bill of Rights where possible, although s5 allows limitations on Bill of Rights rights so long as they are "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society". 15 Section 5 has been described variously as the exception section and the balancing section. 16 Finally, s7 requires the AttorneyGeneral to inform the House where the provisions of any Bill appear to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This requirement is designed to draw any inconsistency to Parliament's intention prior to it passing the Bill.
[7] Of note is the absence of any remedies clause from the operative sections. In fact, a remedies clause in the draft Bill appended to the White Paper was deliberately 13 In Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 676, Cooke P stated (repeating an observation from Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260) "The long title shows that, in affirming the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, the Act requires development of the law when necessary. Such a measure is not to be approached as if it did no more than preserve the status quo." 14 Interestingly, the same may not be true for the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA), which among other things, prohibits discrimination by both public and private actors. The HRA formerly contained s151(1), which prevented the implied repeal of other Acts or regulations. That section has now been repealed. However, it should be noted that the anti-discrimination provisions in the HRA are of much narrower scope than the broad rights in the Bill of Rights. 15 It is to be noted that some of the rights have inherent limitations, for example the right in s22 not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 16 There is debate as to whether to give a wide interpretation to a protected right and then apply s5 more broadly or whether to give a narrow, more focussed interpretation of a particular right and apply s5 more stringently.
removed. 17 This has not impeded the development of remedies for breaches of rights, either in the criminal, 18 or the civil sphere.
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[8] The rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights are enumerated in Part 2 and reflect some, but not all, of those incorporated in the ICCPR. 20 In particular,
there is no equivalent of Art. 17 of the ICCPR which guarantees "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation." 21 Nor, for example, is there a right to found a family, 22 a general right of equality before the law, 23 or additional rights protecting children.
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[9] With regard to security of the person, there is the right not to be deprived of life (s8), not to be subjected to torture or cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment (s9), or medical or scientific experiment (s10). There is also the right to refuse medical treatment (s11). Democratic and civil rights include rights to vote and stand for Parliament (s12) and to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (s13). There is the right to freedom of expression (s14), as well as rights to freedom of assembly, association and movement (ss16, 17, 18). Freedom from discrimination (except affirmative action) is affirmed (s19). Discrimination is defined 17 For discussion of this, see Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 698-699. 18 MOT v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 19 In Baigent's case, 676, Cooke P said: "First, although the New Zealand Act contains no express provision about remedies, this is probably not of much consequence. Subject to ss 4 and 5, the rights and freedoms in Part II have been affirmed as part of the fabric of New Zealand law. The ordinary range of remedies will be available for their enforcement and protection." 20 The selection of rights for inclusion was heavily influenced by John Hart Ely's "process theory" of rights -ie, that to be appropriate for entrenchment in a Bill of Rights, rights should be necessary to buttress the integrity of democratic government. See Paul Rishworth "The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 14. 21 However, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has extracted a limited underlying value of privacy from the s21 guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure -see for example R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290 (CA); R v Smith [2000] 3 NZLR 656 (CA). I note also that the fact that individuals can seek remedies under international law in the field of human rights once domestic remedies are exhausted was seen by Gault P and Blanchard J as a factor to be considered when the Court was considering whether there should be a tort of privacy in New Zealand. See Hosking v Runting CA101/03 25 March 2004, para 6. 22 Art 23, ICCPR. 23 Art 26, ICCPR. But note the specific anti-discrimination rights discussed below. 24 Art 24, ICCPR.
by incorporating the grounds of unlawful discrimination in Part 2 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA).
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[10] Criminal process rights include the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure (s21) and the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained (s22).
Persons who are arrested or detained have the right to be informed of the reasons, to consult and instruct a lawyer, to seek habeas corpus, to be brought before a court as soon as possible and to be treated with humanity and dignity (s23). Persons charged have rights of bail, representation, adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence and trial by jury for offences carrying imprisonment for three months or more (s24).
There are minimum standards of criminal procedure, including, in particular, the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial court, and to the presumption of innocence (s25). Retroactive penalties and double jeopardy are proscribed (s26).
[11] There is also (s27) a more general right to natural justice 26 before tribunals and public authorities, together with rights to apply for judicial review and to bring civil proceedings against the Crown. Section 28 prevents existing rights or freedoms from being abrogated or restricted by reason only that they are not included in the Bill of Rights and s29 extends the benefits of the Bill of Rights to legal persons "so far as practicable".
Application of the Bill of Rights -s3
[12] Any examination of the influence the Bill of Rights has had over New Zealand law must begin with an understanding of how the Bill of Rights applies. With a couple of arguable exceptions, 27 the gateway through which any purported application of Bill of Rights must pass is s3. Section 3 states:
25 By s21 of the HRA those grounds are: sex, martial status, religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, age, political opinion, employment status, family status, sexual orientation. 26 Most consider that the right to natural justice is a procedural guarantee, rather than a substantive guarantee of a remedy. 27 The application of the Bill of Rights to the common law and its use as a tool of statutory interpretation need not necessarily rely on s3.
Application
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New Zealand; or (b)
By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law.
Section 3(a)
[13] If the Bill of Rights applies by virtue of s 3(a) it does so because the act concerned is performed by a qualifying actor. In s3(a) the qualifying actors are the three core branches of government. Because application of the Bill of Rights under this subsection is actor-determined only, even commercial acts by government may be caught. Most applications of the Bill of Rights rely on this subsection.
[14] Taking first the application of the Bill of Rights to the Executive, it is trite that any act done by the police is an act done by the executive branch of Government. It follows that the application of the Bill of Rights is seldom an issue in the criminal context. Acts done by core government departments will also obviously come within s3(a). The main debate over the meaning of the executive branch is whether its scope extends to quasi-governmental agencies such as State-Owned Enterprises. 28 However, in most cases, those seeking to apply the Bill of Rights to actions of these bodies have relied on bringing the Act concerned within s3(b), rather than trying to demonstrate that the body as a whole is sufficiently proximate to the core executive government to be classified as "the executive branch".
[15] The simplest case of the Bill of Rights application to the Executive is the invalidation of public acts (most commonly decisions). In this case, an action would be invalidated simply because it would be contrary to an Act of Parliament, the Bill of Rights. 29 In assessing whether something is contrary to the Bill of Rights there is, however, a two stage process. The first is to determine whether the act is prima facie contrary to an applicable right. The second is to consider whether the breach is nonetheless saved by s5 of the Bill of Rights. Only if the second question is answered in the negative can invalidation result.
[16] Very few review applications have challenged public actions as being illegal simply for being contrary to the Bill of Rights. 30 Perhaps the reason for this is that the broad language of the rights, combined with the potential for a s5 justification notwithstanding a prima facie breach, makes it difficult to predict with any certainty whether an act or decision would be in breach of the Bill of Rights. In such situations, litigants have generally framed their claims in terms of a more conventional piece of legislation and run the Bill of Rights as an alternative only. As a result, the courts have seldom been called upon to pronounce on whether individual public acts are illegal solely by virtue of breaching the Bill of Rights. That said, declaratory relief has occasionally been sought, 31 especially where there is publicity value in a particular act or decision being declared to be contrary to the Bill of Rights.
[17] The application of the Bill of Rights to acts of the legislative and judicial branches of Government is more complex. There are two main approaches here. The first is that literally all acts performed by these branches are subject to the Bill of Rights. The second is that only procedural acts are so subject. Even if only the procedural acts of the Legislature 32 are subject to the Bill of Rights, parliamentary privilege (both in statute 33 and at common law) and principles of comity and justiciability mean that it would be difficult to challenge these procedures in court on the basis of the Bill of Rights.
[18] As regards the law making function, s4 of the Bill of Rights provides that no enactment shall be invalidated by reason only of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights. The application of the Act to the common law seems to me to follow from the language of s3 which refers to acts of the judicial branch of the Government of New Zealand.
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[23] A full-blown substantive approach would require common law that is in breach of the Bill of Rights to be changed. The obvious significance of this is that the In Shelley the plaintiff sought to enforce a racially restrictive covenant made between two private parties. Despite the fact that the common law principles used in interpreting the covenant were entirely neutral, the court refused to enforce it. The court held that the private covenant, standing alone, did not violate the Constitution. However, the act of issuing a judicial decision enforcing the covenant was held to constitute a state action that breached the right to equal protection to which the state was bound to give effect.
application between citizen and State). 41 It should be remembered, however, that, even on this strong approach, the outcome will not necessarily be dramatic. This is because of the effect of s5 of the Bill of Rights.
[24] It is much more widely accepted, however, that the Bill of Rights applies to the common law as a tool of influence rather than an injunction. 42 In this sense, the Bill of Rights operates as a guide to considerations of high policy, which will always be relevant in the development of the common law. The Bill of Rights may thus be said to be potentially relevant to all common law litigants, even if the substantive approach is not accepted. This is similar to the approach that has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.
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[25] An example of judges' use of the Bill of Rights in the development of the common law arises in the recent decision of Hosking v Runting. 44 In that case the Court of Appeal was asked to pronounce on whether a tort of privacy existed in New
Zealand law. The question in the case was whether the publication of photographs of a media celebrity's 18 month old twins taken in the street could be prevented. The
Court was unanimous that publication of the photographs could not be prevented but split on the question of whether there was a tort of privacy, the majority opting for a limited tort of privacy, subject to a legitimate public concern defence.
[26] Gault P and Blanchard J, 45 in a judgment delivered by Gault P, were not prepared to infer a legislative rejection of a tort of privacy from the non-inclusion in They considered that an appropriate balance could be struck between freedom of expression and privacy through the defence of legitimate public concern.
[27] A similar approach was taken by the other Judge favouring a limited tort of privacy, Tipping J. 51 The Bill of Rights is often used as an auxiliary reason to take a particular position rather than the main reason.
whether from the Bill of Rights or from other sources, has pervaded litigation in general.
[ Human Rights. There has long been a presumption that legislation is to be interpreted consistently with treaties, 53 but it seems fair to say that the statutory reference to the ICCPR in the Bill of Rights has strengthened that presumption where human rights are at issue and, as can be seen from the judgments in Hoskings, has brought that dialogue also into discussions of the common law.
[31] Another effect of the Bill of Rights has been the encouragement of more argument from first principles. In New Zealand, while policy debate has always informed legal argument, it has usually in the past been confined to a brief evaluation of potential consequences. Now reference to political philosophy has become more acceptable and that can be attributed in part to the new dialogue arising from the Bill 
Section 3(b)
[32] The other direct route of application of the Bill of Rights is s3(b). Essentially, under this paragraph an act must cumulatively meet the criteria of being: (i) an act done by any person or body (ii) in the performance of any public function, power, or duty (iii) conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law.
[33] In terms of the second requirement, analogies can be drawn with what makes a body ' public' for the purposes of public law review. 
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[34] There is very little case law on either of these criteria. Suffice to say that, in terms of the second criterion, a requirement need not be explicitly included in a statute for it to be conferred or imposed by law, 60 and, in terms of the third criterion, the case law is inconclusive, although a contract alone is unlikely to be sufficient to ed 1995) were: "(i) The "but for" test -whether, but for the existence of a non-statutory body, the government would itself almost inevitably have intervened to regulate the activity in question. (ii) Whether the government has acquiesced or encouraged the activities of the body under challenge by providing "underpinning for its work", has woven the body into the fabric of public regulation or that body was established "under the authority of the government"… The mere fact that existence of the body is explicitly or implicitly recognised in legislation is insufficient. (iii) Whether the body was exercising extensive or monopolistic powers, for instance by effectively regulating entry to a trade, profession or sport…(iv) Whether the aggrieved person has consensually submitted to be bound by the decisionmaker…" 58 meet it.
61 It should also be noted that the s3(b) approach carries the implication that the acts of quasi-governmental bodies might be divided into acts which are sufficiently public and prescribed by law to be caught by s3(b) and acts that do not meet these criteria (for example, private commercial arrangements) which will not be caught.
Statutory interpretation and ss4, 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights
[35] As touched on above, s6 has the effect of requiring legislation to be interpreted in 66 This section (now repealed) stated: "Every Act, and every provision or enactment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything Parliament deems to be for the public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of anything it deems contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large, and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and of such provision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit:" The modern equivalent in the Interpretation Act 1999 is the pithy s5(1): "The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose. to be read consistently with the s19 freedom from discrimination (which protects against discrimination on the grounds of both gender and sexual orientation) so as to include same-sex marriages.
[39] Although the Court was divided over whether the Marriage Act was discriminatory as such, it was unanimous that s6 could not be used to stretch the meaning of marriage as far as was contended. Gault J wrote:
70
The Marriage Act is clear and to give it such different meaning would not be to undertake interpretation but to assume the role of lawmaker which is for Parliament. That is particularly so in an area where the law reflects social values and policy.
[40] Tipping J explained that the meaning contended for could not be a "proper" meaning that could fall to be considered under s6: 71 That question, which arises under s 6 of the Bill of Rights, is whether the Marriage Act can properly be given the meaning for which the appellants contend. They assert that such meaning is necessary to achieve consistency with the right to freedom from discrimination provided for in s 19. Only if such meaning can properly be given may it be preferred to any other meaning. By "properly" I mean by a legitimate process of construction.
[41] Inevitably what is "proper" could be somewhat subjective. However, what can be said is that when a possible meaning that is consistent with the Bill of Rights is open, and that meaning is not contrary to the apparent purpose of the legislation, s6
will be more readily applied. The difficulty comes where, although there is a genuine textual ambiguity, the purpose is strong and a Bill of Rights approach might be taken as defeating the purpose of the statutory words. 69 See the discussion of the position in the UK [42] There have been cases in which s6 has arguably had a particularly notable effect. Perhaps the strongest position on s6 (albeit in obiter comments) was that taken by the Court of Appeal in R v Poumako. 72 Mr Poumako was convicted of murder committed in the context of home invasion. A mandatory non-parole period of 13 years was imposed. As a result of the crime of which Mr Poumako was convicted (which had caused considerable public outrage) Parliament had acted swiftly to increase sentences for crimes involving home invasion. It seemed fairly clear that at least some retrospective effect was intended for that change.
[43] The majority decided that the minimum non-parole period imposed by the judge would have been appropriate under the pre-amendment regime. Nonetheless, they did make some comments on the retrospectivity issue. They identified two interpretative choices open to them, the latter of which would have deprived the enactment of some, but not all, of its retrospective effect. 73 In writing for the majority Gault J opined that, while the court could not deprive the amendment of all retrospective effect, the more restrictive interpretation should be adopted:
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These possible constructions are to be considered by reference to s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act. The meaning to be preferred is that which is consistent (or more consistent) with the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights. It is not a matter of what the legislature (or an individual member) might have intended.
The direction is that wherever a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights can be given, it is to be preferred. The legislature's intention in this regard is clear.
[44] The position taken by the majority, therefore, was that s6 operates as a statutory direction. Thus far, however, s7 has not been directly at issue in the cases and has received little judicial comment.
[45] The decision in R v Pora, 75 another retrospectivity case on the same legislation considered in Poumako, also illustrates the potential strength of the s6 requirement.
This case also concerned the retrospective application of sentencing legislation. Mr
Pora had been convicted of a murder committed in 1992. His conviction was overturned on appeal but he was convicted again on his retrial. The sentencing judge considered that he had no choice but to impose a mandatory minimum non-parole period of 13 years, given the crime had involved home invasion.
[46] A bench of seven was confronted with an apparent contradiction between s4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, which provided that, notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, there was no power to order a penalty that could not be made against the offender at the time of the offence, and s2 (4) [47] The Court allowed the prisoner's appeal, but split in its reasoning. Gault, Keith and McGrath JJ allowed the appeal on the basis that, where there was a choice between limited and expansive readings of the retrospective effect, s6 of the Bill of Rights created a presumption that a retrospective statute did not have more retrospective effect than necessary to achieve its purpose. Taking the most limited reading, the judges held that the statute did not apply retrospectively to Mr Pora as his crime had been committed at a time when there was no power to order minimum nonparole periods.
[48] Elias CJ and Tipping J took a more robust approach, resolving the conflict by concluding that s4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act was the dominant provision, and that there could be no retrospective effect. They wrote: [51] Neither the fact that s 2(4) is later legislation or that it is more specific than s 4 is determinative of the meaning of the legislation or the question as to which of the two irreconcilable provisions is to prevail. These Judge-made rules of thumb do not displace the statutory directions contained in s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and s 7 of the Interpretation Act. It is not a correct approach to assume that pro tanto implied repeal of s 4 is to be preferred to lack of efficacy for s 2(4). It is improbable where human rights are affected that Parliament would do by a side wind what it has not done explicitly. The legislation, properly construed, establishes that s 4 prevails.
[52] …It implements Parliament' s own requirement in s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act that Parliament must speak clearly if it wishes to trench upon fundamental rights.
[49] The significance of this was that the s6 approach, supported by general human rights norms, allowed a general ban on retrospectivity to override a specific, directed section that was passed later in time. Effectively, s6 displaced the traditional approaches to statutory interpretation. The judges then went on to equate s6 with introducing a general principle of legality into New Zealand law, whereby anything entrenching on fundamental rights must be sufficiently certain for the courts to give effect to it: Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document. [17] Although other approaches will probably lead to the same result, those concerned with the necessary analysis and application of ss 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights may in practice find the following approach helpful when it is said that the provisions of another Act abrogate or limit the rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights. After determining the scope of the relevant right or freedom, the first step is to identify the different interpretations of the words of the other Act which are properly open. If only one meaning is properly open that meaning must be adopted. If more than one meaning is available, the second step is to identify the meaning which constitutes the least possible limitation on the right or freedom in question. It is that meaning which s 6 of the Bill of Rights, aided by s 5, requires the Court to adopt. Having adopted the appropriate meaning, the third step is to identify the extent, if any, to which that meaning limits the relevant right or freedom.
[52] A significant feature of this pronouncement is that the meaning which constitutes the least possible limitation on the right must be chosen. can be characterised as more rights-limiting than others. The answer lies in s5, which allows only such limits on a right as can be demonstrably justified. Tipping J said the following on s5:
[18] The fourth step is to consider whether the extent of any such limitation, as found, can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in terms of s5. If the limitation cannot be so justified, there is an inconsistency with the Bill of Rights; but, by dint of s4, the inconsistent statutory provision nevertheless stands and must be given effect. In determining whether an abrogation or limitation of a right or freedom can be justified in terms of s5, it is desirable first to identify the objective which the legislature was endeavouring to achieve by the provision in question. The importance and significance of that objective must then be assessed. The way in which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective. A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut. The means used must also have a rational relationship with the objective, and in achieving the objective there must be as little interference as possible with the right or freedom affected. Furthermore, the limitation involved must be justifiable in the light of the objective. Of necessity value judgments will be involved…. Ultimately, whether the limitation in issue can or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society is a matter of judgment which the Court is obliged to make on behalf of the society which it serves and after considering all the issues which may have a bearing on the individual case, whether they be social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise.
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[53] The combination of ss5 and 6 requires an interpretation resulting in the least possible limitation on the right necessary to achieve the objective, having regarding the importance and difficulty of that objective. This may of course, not necessarily be the least rights-limiting approach. In cases of rights that are not normally subject to limitations, 85 the courts will, however, no doubt be more prepared to take a strong approach in using ss 5 and 6 to achieve a rights-consistent outcome.
[54] Section 4 prevents a court from invalidating any Act on the basis that it is [20] It might be said that the potentially difficult and detailed process involved under s 5 is somewhat academic when the provision in question is bound to be applied according to its tenor by dint of s 4. Section 5 would have had more than persuasive effect if the Court had been given the power, as in Canada, to declare legislation invalid. That was deliberately not done in New Zealand and the late introduction of s 4 into the Bill of Rights was not accompanied by any express recognition of the remaining point of s 5. That section was, however, retained and should be regarded as serving some useful purpose, both in the present statutory context and in its other potential applications. That purpose necessarily involves the Court having the power, and on occasions the duty, to indicate that although a statutory provision must be enforced according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, in that it constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the relevant right or freedom which cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Such judicial indication will be of value should the matter come to be examined by the Human Rights Committee. It may also be of assistance to Parliament if the subject arises in that forum. In the light of the presence of s5 in the Bill of Rights, New Zealand society as a whole can rightly expect that on appropriate occasions the Courts will indicate whether a particular legislative provision is or is not justified thereunder.
[55] The suggested declaration has become known as a declaration of inconsistency or incompatibility. 87 Such a declaration has yet to be formally made. 88 The key point to note is that these declarations have no legal effect -any effect will be political or extra-legal. It has been argued that the availability of declarations will have a profound effect on the constitutional role and functions of the judiciary, adding to the political role of the courts and involving them as a legislative assistant. 89 The fact that no declaration has yet been issued makes this thesis impossible to test. It has also been argued that the making of such declarations is an inappropriate judicial function as it challenges Parliament's exclusive prerogative to make law. 90 However, with the introduction of a statutory power for the Human Rights Review Tribunal to make such declarations where there is an inconsistency with the HRA, it seems Parliament at least has not seen declarations per se as inappropriate.
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[56] It also must be recognised that the process of statutory interpretation itself will result in the courts having to decide that an Act is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
This is on the basis that a provision fails the s5 test and a Bill of Rights consistent interpretation under s6 cannot be found. The judgment will of necessity state that there is this inconsistency, while being required, under s4, to apply the statute anyway. It is difficult to see how this challenges Parliament's sovereignty or politicises the Court's role any more than any other exercise in statutory interpretation. The making of a declaration may, however, add more formality and therefore be a departure from the normal role of the courts.
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The influence of s7 of the Bill of Rights
[57] Section 7 of the Bill of Rights requires the Attorney-General to report to the House whenever a Bill appears to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. The failure of the Attorney-General to report an inconsistency to the House will not, however, impugn the validity of an Act. It is not a manner and form requirement. 93 The act of making a s7 declaration provides a springboard for discussion of whether legislation is important enough to justify any incursion on rights. Section 7, therefore, exists to facilitate informed legislative activity by Parliament. As alluded to above, it may also assist in the interpretation of legislation passed in spite of an adverse s7 report.
[58] An exacting process to determine the existence of such inconsistencies was laid out in a 1991 memorandum by the then Attorney-General. 98 As any potential conflict between a piece of proposed legislation and the Bill of Rights Act will likely also conflict with New Zealand's international obligations under the ICCPR if one is triggered so too will the other. 99 [61] The House is free, however, to ignore the Attorney-General's advice on a Bill and legislate anyway. In some instances, members will conclude on the basis of other advice that, despite an adverse s7 report, there is no breach of the Bill of Rights. An example of this was the Transport Safety Bill 1991 which was to introduce random breath testing in an effort to curb drunk driving. The then Attorney-General reported to the House that the Bill posed an unjustified limit on the right to be free from arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure. 100 The Select Committee examining the Bill received contrary advice from the President of the Legislation Advisory Committee and concluded that there was no such breach.
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[62] There has been some criticism at the frequency with which Attorneys-General have made s7 reports, and of the fact that reports are made in "borderline cases"
where there is a good argument that any breaches could be considered as justified.
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Others argue that s7 reports should be required with regard to all legislation, including legislation thought to be consistent.
Bill of Rights compensation
[63] One of the interesting features of the Bill of Rights is the absence of a remedies clause and therefore one of the more controversial developments was the decision to allow monetary compensation for a breach of the Bill of Rights. 103 In Baigent's case the police held a search warrant for the address occupied by Mrs Baigent (thinking that it was the house of a suspected drug dealer). Upon arrival they were met by the plaintiff's son who contacted his sister, a Wellington barrister.
Despite having ascertained that they were at the wrong home, the police allegedly proceeded to conduct a search anyway. The plaintiff sued for damages on a number of grounds, including a then novel claim of a breach of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s21 of the Bill of Rights. This claim and 100 Hon Paul East (1991) 521 NZPD 6367-6368. This was on the basis that there was not sufficient evidence that random breath testing would add to road safety over and above the random stopping measures already in place. The least rights limiting approach should therefore be taken. 101 [67] The advent of Bill of Rights damages claims has undoubtedly been one of the most jurisprudentially significant developments under the Bill of Rights. Unlike many other developments, it is not one that would likely have occurred as a result of a general increase in the profile of human rights. I note too that, despite the initial controversy surrounding its birth, Bill of Rights compensation appears to be here to stay.
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Operation of the Bill of Rights in the criminal context
[68] The next section of this paper examines the operation of the Bill of Rights in selected areas in the criminal context in order to assess its impact in that field. trial, 116 the more specific Bill of Rights rights are instead invoked. This is in contrast to the position in Australia. In a recent address Spigelman CJ spoke of a:
fundamental principle of administration of justice, the principle of a fair trial…. I use the word principle deliberately. In Australia we do not have, in the form of a Bill of Rights or any equivalent document, a formal recognition of a right to a fair trial. A principle of a fair trial in our system leads me to doubt whether, at least in this respect, the adoption of a Bill of Rights' type provision containing such an express undertaking would lead to any substantial difference in the actual operation of our legal system…. In Australian jurisprudence, the principle of a fair trial is based on the inherent power of a court to control its own processes, particularly, on its power to prevent abuse of its processes. This is quite different in its origins to foundation of such a principle in a Bill of Rights or other such overriding code provision.
Search and seizure
[69] This is dealt with in s21 of the Bill of Rights which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. This is considerably different from the pre-Bill of Rights position, where the validity of searches was determined almost exclusively by reference to whether they were authorised by a statutory or common law power. 117 The starting point was the Entick v Carrington 118 position that state officers had no right to commit a trespass (either to person or property) unless they had positive lawful authority to do so. The consequence of this was that legislative authority was required for criminal investigations which amounted to trespassory interference with persons or property. Illegality is not the touchstone of unreasonableness. In terms of s 21 what is unlawful is not necessarily unreasonable. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of a search will always be highly relevant but will not be determinative either way.
[71] The approach which has instead been adopted is one which is flexible and specific to each individual situation 121 -see R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399, 407:
A search is unreasonable if the circumstances giving rise to it make the search itself unreasonable or if a search which would otherwise be reasonable is carried out in an unreasonable manner. So too seizure. Whether a police search or seizure is unreasonable depends on both the subject-matter and the particular time, place and circumstance.
[72] In the same case, the Court also emphasised (at 409) that:
The Bill of Rights is not a technical document. It has to be applied in our society in a realistic way. The application and interpretation of the Bill must also be true to its purposes as set out in its title of affirming, protecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, and affirming New Zealand' s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The crucial question is whether what was done constituted an unreasonable search or seizure in the particular circumstances. Anyone complaining of a breach must invest the complaint with an air of reality and must lay a foundation for the complaint before the trial Court by explicit challenge or cross-examination or evidence.
[73] With the relaxation of the prescriptive prima facie rule for exclusion of evidence and the invocation of a more flexible balancing approach (discussed below), there is some suggestion that lawfulness may become more determinative than it has been. In R v Maihi, the Court of Appeal stated that "[u]nless the Crown is able to advance sufficient countervailing material, the Court is likely to find an unlawful search to be unreasonable". 122 The reasonableness or otherwise of a search or seizure is "ultimately a value judgment which the Court must make on a principled basis, bearing in mind all the relevant factors of the case".
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[74] The courts were also quick to expand protection beyond the traditional trespass categories. In R v Jefferies, the Court of Appeal broadened the scope of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, in line with the approach of the 121 This approach has been the subject of a significant amount of academic criticism. property, personal freedom, privacy and dignity" 126 and Thomas J emphasised the centrality of privacy. 127 The approach thus broadened from one focussed on protecting property rights to one focussed on the protection of the privacy interests of individuals.
[75] In practice, this has resulted in several types of investigatory techniques, which may have been beyond scrutiny at common law, falling within the compass of s21. These include audio and video surveillance, 128 aerial observation as part of a cannabis surveillance operation, 129 and the retrieval of mobile phone text messages from a telephone company. 130 It has been argued that this would not have occurred were it not for the enactment of the Bill of Rights, with the common law tying the control of such activities to a pre-existing and relatively narrow bundle of rights dealing with the protection and defence of property, resulting in a set of principles which failed to keep pace with new, increasingly invasive, investigative techniques. There is no duty on the police when informing persons arrested of their right to a lawyer to go on to give advice designed to facilitate the exercise of that right. The police officer may decide to do so in order to assist in the understanding of the right. But any duty to facilitate the manner of its exercise is not triggered until there is an indication by the person arrested of the desire to consult a lawyer.
Right to counsel
[79] Mallinson makes it clear that the right to counsel is a right to access to counsel and not a right to provision. But an issue currently under debate is whether police should be required to inform detainees that a free lawyer is available through the police legal detention scheme. This is particularly interesting because it questions the extent to which the Bill of Rights should be considered as charter of negative guarantees rather than one imposing positive duties. 135 Mallinson has been interpreted by some judges as meaning that there is no universal duty on police to inform detainees that a lawyer is free. … fair opportunity for the person arrested to consider and decide whether or not to exercise that right.
It seems to the majority of the Court that the latter view is more consonant with an appreciation of the realities of detention, and with the principle of access to justice acknowledged by the Legal Services Act 2000.
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[80] The other question that often arises is the limit placed on the State once the detainee, having fully understood the right, has elected to consult a lawyer. The general position appears to be that the State can do nothing actively to elicit information from the accused prior to the initial consultation with the lawyer (unless it is clear the right has been waived). 138 Police questioning, after the right to counsel has been enjoyed is a matter closely associated with questioning after invoking the right to silence and a similar rule applies. 
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[82] The right to silence has been longstanding in New Zealand law. This right was, both prior to the introduction of the Bill of Rights and now, protected by the common law via the Judges' Rules 141 and the fairness rules for confession evidence. 142 As McMullin J put it in 1994:
[a]t common law every citizen enjoys the right to silence; neither a private citizen nor a constable has any effective power to demand answers to questions put to a citizen in the belief that he has committed an offence or is under some other form of liability.
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[83] In practice, s23(4) is seldom relied upon in the context of pre-trial statements.
It has been suggested that this is the result of two factors. 144 First, where there has been a failure to give advice regarding the right to silence there is usually also a failure to advise of the right to counsel. Consequently many cases where s23 (4) is potentially relevant are instead primarily pursued as breaches of the right to counsel.
The second reason is that foreshadowed above, that the right replicates the preexisting common law position and therefore many cases are dealt with using preexisting common law rules, without recourse to the Bill of Rights.
[84] Section 23 (4) [i]n the great bulk of the situations covered by this Bill, the law and the courts will be able to provide a remedy from their present armoury. which is obtained in breach of the prohibitions on torture or unreasonable search and seizure may be excluded from a trial; a stay of proceedings may be sought.
[86] This was clearly a reference to the inherent power of courts to exclude evidence where it is unfairly obtained. It was uncontroversial, then, when the courts identified that they had a similar power to exclude evidence where rights under the Bill of Rights Act had been breached. However, a significantly more controversial question was whether a breach of the Act necessitated such a remedy. In 1993 the Court of Appeal, initially in the context of confessions, developed a rule of prima facie exclusion, whereby, unless there were compelling reasons why the evidence should be admitted, it would be inadmissible. 149 The rule was quickly extended to cover real evidence. The prima facie rule may be excluded and the evidence admitted where the breach was inconsequential, where there was no real and substantial connection between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence or where the evidence would have been discovered in any event. The only justification in any such case or in any other case for allowing the admission of the evidence is that the overriding interests of justice require it notwithstanding breach of that fundamental right affirmed and protected by the Bill of Rights.
[88] The failure, particularly by Judges in lower courts, to develop exceptions to the rule led to its modification. 152 When the rule as a whole was re-examined by a seven member bench in the 2002 case of R v Shaheed, Blanchard J (joined by Richardson P and Tipping J) commented on its practical effect in the following terms: 153 in practice the exclusion of evidence has followed almost automatically once it has been established that there has been a breach which is more than trivial and that there is a sufficient connection between that breach and the availability of the challenged evidence. The use of the terminology of "rule", "prima facie" and "exceptions" (to the rule) has often led, in our opinion, to a relatively narrow and almost mechanical approach by Judges, without going through a balancing of the relevant considerations, once they have determined that a breach of a right has occurred which was more than trivial and that the circumstances did not demand urgency. There has been a tendency to go no further than looking for a category of exception to the "rule", rather than seeking to ascertain whether exclusion of the evidence would be a truly proportionate response to the breach. [89] In Shaheed, all but one member of the Court rejected the prima facie exclusion 
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[90] Shaheed has been criticised as inviting uncertainty and an unacceptable amount of discretion into the area. 155 On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that Shaheed has provided a structure for the application of the existing judicial discretion to exclude evidence due to unfairness in all cases -including those not involving the Bill of Rights.
156
[91] The Shaheed approach is still significantly different from the pre-Bill of Rights common law position. The basic common law principle was that relevant evidence was admissible, with Courts not generally concerned with how it was obtained, 157 subject to the discretion to exclude evidence where it was unfairly obtained or would result in an unfair trial. 158 Additionally there was the residual discretion to stay proceedings where they would amount to an abuse of the court's process.
[92] Under s24(a), an accused has the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of any charge against him or her. In practice, this has not proved to be troublesome to prosecuting authorities. This is because of the interpretation given to the term "charged". In R v Gibbons [1997] 2 NZLR 585, 595 the High Court said that:
[h]aving regard to the scheme of the Bill of Rights Act, and the individual sections, "charged" must refer to an intermediate step in the prosecutorial process when the prosecuting authority formally advises an arrested person that he is to be prosecuted and gives him particulars of the charges he will face.
[93] Consequently, in most instances the accused will be formally notified of the details of the charge at the same time they are charged, satisfying the requirements of s24(a). One possible situation where s24(a) may be of some significance is where
Police conceal or downplay the seriousness of the charges an accused faces in order to facilitate questioning about a criminal offence. 159 In such situations, the Police risk a finding that any admissions obtained as a result of the questioning were obtained in breach of s24(a), and therefore would need to satisfy the Shaheed test before they could be admitted.
Right to be released on reasonable terms and conditions
[94] Section 24(b) creates a right to be released on reasonable terms and conditions unless there is just cause for continued detention. This is, in essence, a right to bail.
However, the Bail Act 2000 forms a detailed and comprehensive statutory code for bail matters, central to which is a virtually identical provision. 160 Consequently, the presence of the right in the Bill of Rights is of little practical consequence, apart from arguably encouraging judges to examine more critically the arguments put forward by the Crown as justifying pre-trial detention. 164 the principle which is fundamental and which admits of no departure therefrom -namely, that every accused person must have the fullest opportunity of putting forward his defence and there is, too, the supplementary principle that it is important in the conduct of judicial proceedings not only that what is done shall in fact be perfectly fair but that it should bear the appearance of fairness.
[96] As this indicates, if the s24(d) right is breached, the result will be an unfair trial -something the common law has been concerned with for centuries.
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[97] The ability of self-represented defendants adequately to research and present their defence is, however, an area where s24(d) has had an impact. In R v Payne
[2003] 3 NZLR 638, the accused claimed that he should be granted bail pending his trial as he was prejudiced in preparing his defence due to an inability to access legal texts and other sources relevant to the preparation of various interlocutory applications. The Court considered that "[t]he right under the Bill of Rights set out above is an essential one -essential to the rights of those charged and a fair system of justice overall" but nevertheless declined the application as such potential application based on concrete circumstances and subject to proper safeguards might well have a better prospect of success.
[98] Section 24(d) might also potentially mean that the facilities (including computer facilities) provided to prisoners awaiting trial may need to be expanded. In R v Greer 4/6/03, CA197/01, the Court of Appeal (at para 39) stated:
We comment that it may be open to doubt in the twenty first century that the provision of writing materials only to an inmate, could in all cases be regarded as adequate facilities with which to prepare that defence, particularly if the inmate plans to conduct his or her own defence. It may therefore be time for the regulations relating to computers in cells to be revisited or at least for prisons to ensure that access to computers is provided in another manner to those who may need them to prepare their defence.
[99] It has also been suggested that s24(d) has "supplemented" existing rights to criminal discovery. 166 It is questionable, however, whether the Bill of Rights has substantially altered the pre-existing position. 167 The main reason for this is that the [102] The Court, however, cautioned that there was a distinction to be drawn between obstructing the preparation of a defence (which impugned s24(d)), and the existence of an affirmative duty on Police to assist in the collection of evidence useful for the defence. Furthermore, in subsequent cases, Courts have been clear that the evidence which was lost must have been of "material assistance to the defence" so as to be "necessary for a fair trial".
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How effective has the Bill of Rights been?
[103] This paper has provided an overview of how the Bill of Rights operates and its effect on New Zealand law.
[104] The exact extent of the effect the Bill of Rights will remain a matter of debate.
Those who contend for its being insignificant generally argue that the increasing presence of human rights values would have in any case brought about many of the changes that the Bill of Rights is credited with through common law development. Rights has accelerated that process and that the existence of legislation formally recognising these rights has meant the three branches of Government have had to be more rights conscious. 171 They also argue that it has legitimised the judicial creativity needed to increase protection of rights. They point to the creation of new remedies such as Bill of Rights compensation and the changed exclusionary rules for evidence in support of their view.
[105] Ultimately, although the Bill of Rights has existed for 14 years, it is still too early to gauge its full impact accurately. Certainly, there is the potential for its influence to grow, particularly if it is given wider application. But whether that potential will be realised is still impossible to predict -much may turn on whether trends in internationalisation and human rights recognition continue with the same momentum they have at present.
